By many accounts, quantum computing (QC), which uses atomic âspinâ instead of an electrical charge to represent its binary 1âs and 0âs, is evolving at an exponential rate. If QC is ever realized at scale, it could be a boon for human society, helping to improve crop yields, design better medicines and engineer safer airplanes, among other benefits.Â
The crypto sector could profit too. Just last week, for instance, a Bank of Canada-commissioned project simulated cryptocurrency adoption among Canadian financial organizations using quantum computing.Â
âWe wanted to test the power of quantum computing on a research case that is hard to solve using classical computing techniques,â said Maryam Haghighi, director of data science at the Bank of Canada, in a press release.Â
But, others worry that quantum computing, given its extraordinary âbrute forceâ power, could also crack blockchainâs cryptographic structure, which has served Bitcoin (BTC) so well since its inception. Indeed, some say it is only a matter of time before quantum computers will be able to identify the enormous prime numbers that are key constituents of a BTC private key â assuming no countermeasures are developed.Â
Along these lines, a recently published paper calculated just how much quantum power would be needed to duplicate a BTC private key, i.e., âthe number of physical qubits required to break the 256-bit elliptic curve encryption of keys in the Bitcoin network,â as explained by the paperâs authors, who are associated with the University of Sussex.Â
To be sure, this will be no easy task. Bitcoinâs algorithm that converts public keys to private keys is âone way,â which means that it is easy to generate a public key from a private key but virtually impossible to derive a private key from a public key using present-day computers.Â
In addition, this would all have to be done in about 10 minutes, the average amount of time that a public key is exposed or vulnerable on the Bitcoin network. It also assumes that the public key is identical to the BTC address, as were most in Bitcoinâs early days before it became common practice to use the KECCAK algorithm to âhashâ public keys to generate BTC addresses. Itâs estimated that about one-quarter of existing Bitcoin is using unhashed public keys.
Given these constraints, the authors estimate that 1.9 billion qubits would be needed to penetrate a single Bitcoin private key within 10 minutes. Qubits, or quantum bits, are the analog to âbitsâ in classical computing. By comparison, most proto-QC computers today can summon up 50â100 qubits, though IBMâs state-of-the-art Eagle quantum processor can manage 127 qubits.Â
Put another way, thatâs 127 qubits against the 1.9 billion needed to crack Bitcoinâs security using a large-scale trapped ion quantum computer, as proposed in the AVS Quantum Science paper.
Mark Webber, quantum architect at Universal Quantum, a University of Sussex spin-out firm, and the paperâs lead author, said, âOur estimated requirement […] suggests Bitcoin should be considered safe from a quantum attack for now, but quantum computing technologies are scaling quickly with regular breakthroughs affecting such estimates and making them a very possible scenario within the next 10 years.âÂ
Is the threat real?
Could Bitcoinâs security really be cracked? âI think that quantum computers could break cryptocurrency,â Takaya Miyano, a professor of mechanical engineering at Japanâs Ritsumeikan University, told Cointelegraph, âThough, not in a few years time, but in 10â20 years time.â
Miyano recently lead a team that developed a chaos-based stream cipher designed to withstand attacks from large-scale quantum computers.
David Chaum, writing last year for Cointelegraph, also sounded the alarm â not only for crypto but for wider society as well:
âPerhaps most terrifying for a society so reliant on the internet, quantum-level computing puts all of our digital infrastructures at risk. Our contemporary internet is built on cryptographyâ â the use of codes and keys to secure private communication and storage of data.â
Meanwhile, for cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ether (ETH), âfor whom this concept is fundamental, one sufficiently powerful quantum computer could mean the theft of billions of dollars of value or the destruction of an entire blockchain altogether,â continued Chaum.
There are more than 4 million BTC âthat are potentially vulnerable to a quantum attack,â consulting firm Deloitte estimates, a number that comprises owners using un-hashed public keys or who are reusing BTC addresses, another unwise practice. At current market prices, that amounts to about $171 billion at risk.Â
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âPersonally, I think that we are unable at the moment to make a good estimationâ of the time it will take before quantum computers can break BTCâs encryption, Itan Barmes, quantum security lead at Deloitte Netherlands and project fellow at the World Economic Forum, told Cointelegraph. But, many experts today estimate 10-15 years, he said. Many of these estimates, too, are for breaking the encryption without time constraints. Doing it all within 10 minutes will be more difficult.
Other cryptocurrencies, not just Bitcoin, could be vulnerable too, including those with proof-of-stake (PoS) validation mechanisms; Bitcoin uses a proof-of-work (PoW) protocol. âIf blockchain protocol exposes public keys for a sufficiently long time, it automatically becomes vulnerable under quantum attacks,â Marek Narozniak, a physicist and member of Tim Byrnesâ quantum research group at New York University, told Cointelegraph. âIt could allow an attacker to forge transactions or impersonate block producersâ identity for PoS systems.âÂ
Time to prepare
It seems the crypto industry might have about a decade to get ready for a potential QC onslaught, and this is crucial. Narozniak noted:
âThere is more than enough time to develop quantum-safe cryptography standards and work out adequate forks to currently used blockchain protocols.â
When asked if he was confident that post-quantum cryptography will be developed in time to thwart hackers before the 10-minute barrier is broken, Deloitteâs Barmes referenced a more recent paper he co-authored on quantum risks to the Ethereum blockchain that describes two types of attacks: a storage attack and a transit attack. The first âis less complicated to execute, but to defend against it, you donât necessarily need to replace the cryptography algorithm.â On the other hand, he told Cointelegraph:
âThe transit attack is much more difficult to execute and is also much more difficult to protect against. There are some candidate algorithms that are believed to be resistant to quantum attacks. However, they all have performance drawbacks that can be detrimental to the applicability and scalability to the blockchain.â
An armâs race?
What is unfolding in this area, then, appears to be a sort of arms race â as computers grow more powerful, defensive algorithms will have to be developed to meet the threat.Â
âThis overall pattern is really nothing new to us,â said Narozniak. âWe see it in other industries as well.â Innovations are introduced, and others try to steal them, so piracy protection mechanisms are developed, which provoke even more clever theft devices.Â
âWhat makes this quantum-safe cryptography case a little bit different is that the quantum algorithms impose a more drastic change. After all, those devices are based on different physics and for certain problems they offer different computational complexity,â added Narozniak.
Indeed, QC makes use of an uncanny quality of quantum mechanics whereby an electron or atomic particle can be in two states at the same time. In classical computing, an electric charge represents information as either an 0 or a 1 and that is fixed, but in quantum computing, an atomic particle can be both a 0 and a 1, or a 1 and a 1, or a 0 and a 0, etc. If this unique quality can be harnessed, computing power explodes manyfold, and QCâs development, paired with Shorâs algorithm â first described in 1994 as a theoretical possibility, but soon to be a wide-reaching reality, many believe â also threatens to burst apart RSA encryption, which is used in much of the internet including websites and email.Â
âYes, itâs a very tough and exciting weapons race,â Miyano told Cointelegraph. âAttacks â including side-channel attacks â to cryptosystems are becoming more and more powerful, owing to the progress in computers and mathematical algorithms running on the machines. Any cryptosystem could be broken suddenly because of the emergence of an incredibly powerful algorithm.â
Simulating financial relationshipsÂ
One shouldnât necessarily assume that quantum computingâs impact on the crypto sector will be entirely deleterious, however. Samuel Mugel, chief technology officer at Multiverse Computing, the firm that led the above-referenced program at Bank of Canada, explained that in the pilot, they were able to simulate a network of financial relationships in which the decisions that one firm might make were highly dependent on decisions of other firms, further explaining to Cointelegraph:
âGame theory networks like this are very hard for normal supercomputers to solve because more optimal behaviors can get overlooked. Quantum computers have ways of dealing with this type of problem more efficiently.â
Devices based on quantum mechanics potentially offer other unique possibilities, added Narozniak, âFor instance, unlike classical states, quantum states cannot be copied. If digital tokens were represented using the quantum states, the no-cloning theorem would automatically protect them from being double-spent.â
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Quantum entanglement could also be used to secure quantum smart contracts, Narozniak said. âTokens could be entangled during the execution of the contract making both parties vulnerable to eventual loss if the smart contract is not executed as agreed.â
Developing post-quantum cryptography
All in all, the threat to the cryptoverse from quantum computing appears real, but enormous power would be required to breach cryptoâs underlying cryptography, and hackers would also have to work under stringent time constraints â having only 10 minutes to penetrate a BTC private key, for instance. The reality of breaking Bitcoinâs elliptic curve encryption through the use of quantum computing is at least a decade away, too. But, the industry needs to get started now in developing deterrents. âI would say that we should be ready on time, but we need to start working seriously on it,â said Barmes.
In fact, a substantial amount of research is now taking place âin post-quantum crypto,â Dawn Song, a professor in the computer science division at the University of California, Berkeley, told Cointelegraph, adding:
âIt is important that we develop quantum-resistant, or post-quantum, cryptography so we have the alternatives ready when quantum computers are powerful enough in reality.âÂ